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There has been a lot of controversy about research work done on the H5N1 bird flu virus. In particular there is some discussion about if the results should be openly published. |
The fear
The fear is that the experiments based on mutations of the H5N1 bird flu virus could be used by terrorist groups. The experiments show how the virus could mutate into a form that would spread easily amongst humans.
There are two papers submitted to Nature, one written by Kawaoka (Wisconsin-Madison) and the other by Fouchier (Erusmus Medical Centre). You can read a Q&A from Nature publishing group here.
The US National Security Advisory Board for Biotechnology (NSABB) has asked Nature to remove some of the information that could be useful to terrorists. World Health Organization in Geneva has stated that more discussion is needed.
There is also the opinion that the dissemination of the full work is important if we want to tackle the natural threat of bird flu.
I am far from an expert in this area and cannot offer an informed professional opinion about this specific issue. I suggest people start by reading the BBC report.
The wider issue
The problem is that not disseminating the work in full goes against the ethos of modern science. Progress is made only by sharing ideas and results. The scientific community will pick up on parts of a given work and further develop them. This is how progress is made and prevents scientists “re-discovering the wheel” every time then engage in research.
Science is there for the benefit of wider society. This is not just in practical medical or engineering terms, but also culturally. Couple this with the fact that most fundamental science is paid for by public tax money, scientists have a moral duty to disseminate their work.
But…
The debate really starts when scientific work can clearly be perverted and used for harm. One has to think about the greater good.
It is an unfortunate fact that human conflicts drive science and invention. We must reconcile our position with the assertion that all scientists and engineers involved in “war work” are developing terrible things for a greater good, at least as they see it.
So that said, we still have the issue of scientific censorship by governments and other agencies. Generically, scientists will want to publish their work, with the greater good in mind.
Now what?
We need academic and scientific freedom. However, that does not mean a “free for all” attitude and we do have many safeguards about conducting ethical research.
It could be possible that some research, principally the details are just so sensitive that they do pose a real threat. Scientists, governments and society have to think about this.
Maybe we need a wider debate about ethical dissemination.
I have to question how accessible is the technology and how much education is required to actually be capable of such a dubious plot. After ten minutes of research I have to conclude, not entirely that much. At first thought I suspected that maybe this was a somewhat larger–I want to say organism but–viral species but it seems to be small enough to only be properly observed using electron microscopy. The downside is this isn’t such a terribly difficult thing to do. The second question I had to ask was, what are the mechanics involved in such a species. H5N1 is simply another enveloped virus–it is made of a modified plasma membrane–and is studded with a variety of proteins that articulate its functions. The vRNA is composed of 8 segments that code for 11 proteins and consist of a rough total of 15000 base pairs. I suspect that not disclosing all aspects of such research would be beneficial to inhibiting this activity, and yet I believe it is also unsafe to believe that it would in any way be detrimental to the success of any truly determined organization.
CHEUNG, TIMOTHY K. W., and LEO L. M. POON. “Biology of Influenza A Virus.” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1102 (2007): 1 – 25. John Willey and Sons.
That is an interesting Q&A discussion at the Nature site.
I seems to me that what we are seeing is the effect of science that has potentially reaching the point at which information might enable the construction of weapons, and the concern generated by that state of affairs.
I think most people agree that open and wide dissemination of fundamental science is beneficial to science and to humanity as a whole. Yet there is also widespread agreement that some aspects of technology are properly kept secret.
Consider the analogy with nuclear weapons. The fundamental principles of nuclear physics are openly published and widely known. This is as it should be. But the engineering details involved in the production of nuclear weapons are highly classified, again as they should be. The distinction between science and engineering in this instance lies in the information necessary to actually build destructive devices, and it the devices themselves and not the fundamental science that offer the potential for destructive use.
In the case at hand we have biological science that, at least in the judgment of some, might enable terrorist organizations or terrorist nations to construct biological weapons of mass destruction. I doubt that there is any enthusiasm to enable such organizations to gain that capability.
So, the fundamental question is whether the information proposed to be made public in the paper is merely basic science, or whether it would enable irresponsible organizations to gain a capability that would be detrimental to the security of the world. I am not sufficiently expert in the science involved to be able to make a definitive judgment on that matter. I am forced to rely on the judgment of people such as those who have requested that the paper be redacted.
However, I do know that one can reverse the effect of redaction in the future if it were deemed beneficial to do so. I also know that that cannot reverse the effect of having published the information openly if it were determined to have been a mistake.
I further note that no call has been made to place the information under military classification, and that informal one-on-one communication between scientists who know one another can make up, in the scientific research process, for what may not be available in other open literature.
Therefore I see little evidence for any clear or long-lasting harm from redacting the papers at this juncture.
@DrRocket: “Therefore I see little evidence for any clear or long-lasting harm from redacting the papers at this juncture.”
I tend to agree at this stage. As long as this does not set a trend that would change drastically how and what one can publish.
The comparison with nuclear technology is probably apt, though I was reluctant myself to say so. This is because Iran today is actively trying to create nuclear weapons. As you say, the science is not at all secret, some of the engineering is. How useful the studies of H5N1 will be useful to Al-Qaeda, Iran or North Korea I have no idea.
Then I know of Iranian students in the West studying engineering, biological sciences and so on…